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Abstract 
In May 2015, a Women’s Court was held in Sarajevo over a four-day period. It was the first 
such court on European soil for more than 40 years and reflected a growing awareness 
within the former Yugoslavia of the limitations of criminal trials, both international and 
national. The author attended the Women’s Court, and this article draws on both her 
experiences as a participant observer and her interviews with some of the organizers and 
witnesses. While it is too soon to know whether the Court will produce any substantive 
results or have any lasting impact, this article seeks to offer an early analysis. While the 
organizers of the Court theorized it as feminist justice, this article regards feminist justice as 
part of what Haldemann terms ‘justice as recognition’. Analyzing and assessing the Court 
within this conceptual framework, it argues that the Court successfully delivered justice as 
recognition at a symbolic level. The challenge now is how to translate this symbolic justice 
as recognition into a more tangible and practical form. 
 
Keywords 
Women’s Court; former Yugoslavia; justice as recognition; Haldemann; feminist justice; 
solidarity. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote that ‘It is every man’s 
business to see justice done’. These words take on a particular resonance in post-conflict 
societies torn apart by violence and bloodshed. The international community insists on 
justice; the incoming regime promises justice; victims demand justice. In lieu of much-
needed debates pertaining to the multi-perspectival meanings of, and possibilities for 
achieving, justice in such societies, however, ‘justice’ is most often viewed through a narrow 
judicial lens and reduced to the holding of criminal trials. While few would surely disagree 
that ‘[i]ndividuals who play a prominent role during wartime must be held accountable for 
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their actions and what they bring about’,1 the importance of criminal justice should not 
detract from diverse complementary forms of justice – such as restorative, reparative and 
socio-economic. Rather than understanding transitional justice as ‘characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’,2 it is more 
helpful to conceptualize it as a ‘toolbox’ containing multiple elements and parts.3 That the 
latter can be used and combined in different ways highlights, in turn, the fact that transitional 
justice represents ‘an ongoing experiment…’.4 Dealing with a legacy of human rights abuses 
and war crimes, in short, requires creativity and innovation, as part of a holistic approach 
that extends beyond criminal trials and the dispensing of formalized criminal justice. 
          This article focuses on a recent example of such creativity and innovation within the 
former Yugoslavia. In May 2015, a Women’s Court – the first in Europe for nearly 40 years – 
was held in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH). The culmination of five years of hard 
work, extensive organization and tireless commitment on the part of more than 200 civil 
society organizations (NGOs) across the former Yugoslavia, the Women’s Court reflected a 
growing awareness of the limitations of criminal trials, both at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in national courts. The aim of the Women’s 
Court – which involved neither perpetrators nor judges – was precisely to offer something 
different. Approaching justice through a feminist rather than a legal lens, the Court sought to 
create a safe space that would empower woman from across the former Yugoslavia to tell 
their stories of suffering, courage and resistance. In the words of Staša Zajović, the co-
founder and co-ordinator of the Women in Black in Belgrade, ‘…women are not only a 
                                                          
1 Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, Ethics and International Affairs 16 (2002): 43-56, at 53. 
2 Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Geneology’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 69-94, at 
69. 
3 Catherine M. Franke, ‘Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice’, Columbia Journal of Gender and 
Law 15 (2006): 813-828, at 825. 
4 Ibid. 
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source of information, but agents and interpreters of history…’.5 Concerns that the Women’s 
Court would re-traumatize and exploit victims meant that several prominent women’s NGOs 
were notably absent from the proceedings. This author, in contrast, did attend the Court, and 
the present article constitutes an early analysis of this recent experiment in transitional 
justice. 
          It is too soon to know whether the Women’s Court will lead to any concrete results and 
positive change. How, then, are we to assess the Court? This article begins by reflecting on 
the importance of justice, and hence a logical starting point might be to ask whether the 
Women’s Court delivered justice, specifically to the 35 women who told their stories. Yet 
such a question is too broad and abstract, unless the meaning of ‘justice’ is more clearly 
specified. This article accordingly takes as its theoretical starting point Haldemann’s concept 
of justice as recognition, ‘the kind of justice that is involved in giving due recognition to the 
pain and humiliation experienced by victims of collective violence’.6 Analyzing the Women’s 
Court within this conceptual framework, it argues that the Court successfully delivered justice 
as recognition. As the latter is largely symbolic, however, the challenge now is to turn this 
recognition into a more practical and substantive form. Divided into three core sections, the 
article’s first section sets out the notion of justice as recognition and explores its utility, 
particularly as a counter-balance to the perpetrator-centric focus of criminal courts. While 
arguing that the concepts of justice as recognition and feminist justice closely overlap, both 
of them sharing the same normative starting point, it also seeks to demonstrate that the 
former has certain strengths over the latter, making it an appropriate framework within which 
to analyze the Women’s Court. The second, more empirical section examines whether and 
how the Women’s Court provided justice as recognition. The third section discusses possible 
ways of further building on the Court’s work and developing its legacy. 
                                                          
5 Staša Zajović, ‘The Women’s Court: A Feminist Approach to Justice – Review of the Process of 
Organizing the Women’s Court’, Women’s Court: About the Process, ed. in Staša Zajović (Belgrade: 
Women in Black, 2015), 7-66, at 40. 
6 Frank Haldemann, ‘Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognition’, Cornell 
International Law Journal 41 (2008): 675-737, at 678. 
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          This article draws heavily on the author’s personal observations and experience of 
attending the Women’s Court. Semi-structured interviews with 11 individuals who were 
involved in the Women’s Court process further inform this research. In Belgrade, the three 
interviewees were all from the Women in Black. In Zagreb, the author interviewed a member 
of the International Board of the Women’s Court, a human rights activist who led the 
Women’s Court process in Croatia and a psychologist-psychotherapist who worked closely 
with the women who testified at the Women’s Court. Interviews in Zagreb were also 
conducted with a potential witness at the Women’s Court and two actual witnesses. Finally, 
a Bosnian Muslim woman who spoke at the Women’s Court about her experience of being 
raped during the Bosnian war, and a Macedonian woman (also raped during the Bosnian 
war) who attended the Women’s Court shared their views of the Court.  
 
2. Dimensions of Justice 
 
2.1 Three vignettes and the limitations of criminal justice 
 
The author recently spent a year in BiH researching the long-term consequences of the 
mass rapes committed during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war.7 While rape survivors 
consistently emphasized the need for their perpetrators to be held accountable and 
punished, their stories also highlighted the limitations of criminal justice – and it is precisely 
these limitations that furnished an important rationale for the Women’s Court. 
          X was raped in a camp in Konjic municipality during the Bosnian war. She was in her 
40s. She has testified at the ICTY on two occasions. The man who raped her was convicted 
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. 
Today, she lives alone in a small flat in Republika Srpska, having previously spent eight 
years in a collective centre. She takes tablets to help her sleep and she always leaves the 
                                                          
7 Between August 2014 and August 2015, as part of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship, the author 
interviewed 77 survivors (men and women) of war rape and sexual violence in BiH. The Humanities 
and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee at the University of Birmingham granted full ethical 
approval for this research on 28 July 2014. 
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light on at night. Her back constantly hurts, which she attributes to sleeping on the floor in 
the camp, and she would like to be able to go to a spa but her monthly pension is just 240 
Bosnian Marks (approximately £85). A year after her rapist was granted early release, he 
called her and threatened that he would do to her again what he did in 1992. Bosnian police 
confirmed that the call came from her assailant. The latter was questioned but no action was 
taken. X described her life as no longer having any purpose. She feels forgotten.8 
          Y was raped in 1993 by a neighbour in central BiH who had joined the Croatian 
Defence Council (HVO). She was 26 years old. Her rapist stood trial in Sarajevo and 
received a nine-year sentence (later reduced to eight years). She has had numerous 
gynaecological problems and cervical cancer. Her husband left her after she had a 
hysterectomy. He started to change towards her after she told him that she was raped. Her 
war trauma never fades and is always with her. She cries frequently, cannot sleep and is 
depressed. She no longer has any desire to fight for herself. She is only fighting for her 
children and worries that her trauma has affected them. The fact that she has a job keeps 
her sane. She feels humiliated, as though she has ‘raped woman’ written across her 
forehead. She takes several showers a day because she feels dirty.9 
          Z was effectively imprisoned in her own home in Hercegovina for a month in 1992 and 
raped. She was in her mid-30s. She testified against one of the perpetrators in Sarajevo in 
2008. He got a nine-year sentence. The second man who raped her is still free. She feels 
that the court forgot about her after she gave her testimony. She relocated to another part of 
BiH in 1995, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, but does not feel at home 
there. She misses the mountains where she grew up. She lives alone and no longer feels 
any sense of security. She is distrustful of men and needs tablets in order to sleep. She is 
not the same person that she was before she was raped. She used to laugh all the time.10 
                                                          
8 Personal interview, Višegrad, BiH, 9 October 2014. 
9 Personal interview, Vitez, BiH, 5 February 2015. 
10 Personal interview, Trebinje, BiH, 23 April 2015. 
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          All three women have received some degree of legal justice through the courts. What 
is clear from the aforementioned vignettes, however, is that criminal justice alone is seldom 
enough. Indeed, three particularly salient points stand out from the vignettes in this regard. 
The first is that crime – and not just the crime of war rape – has major ‘ripple effects’.11 While 
this term is most commonly utilized to convey the fact that crime horizontally impacts on 
individuals close to the victim and on the wider community, it is also appropriate to use the 
term in a more vertical and temporal way, in recognition of the reality that the commission of 
a crime – and in particular highly intimate crimes such as rape and sexual violence12 – will 
often continue to impact on the victim’s life many years later. In other words, the injustice 
committed against the crime victim is not a one-time event but rather an unfolding and multi-
layered process. This is the context in which the work of criminal courts, whether 
international or local, should be critiqued and assessed. As Sajjad remarks, ‘Ultimately, 
seeking justice in courts of law does not overcome many of the socio-political circumstances 
that define the realities of survivors…’.13 Criminal trials, in other words, are only one of the 
multiple fabrics that constitute the complex mosaic of justice.  
          The second point is that in all of the three preceding vignettes, the women talked 
about the affective legacy of the crimes committed against them. They expressed feelings, 
inter alia, of insecurity, humiliation and uncleanliness. Their stories thereby draw attention to 
the fact that the perpetration of a crime is not only about facts and details. It is also about the 
intangibles of sentiments and emotions. How did the crime make the victim feel? How did it 
impact on his/her self-image and views of others? The criminal trial process, concerned with 
                                                          
11 South West Scotland Community Justice Authority, The Ripple Effect: A Victim Awareness Toolkit 
(March 2013), http://www.swscja.org.uk/the-ripple-effect.html (accessed 14 May 2015). 
12 The article uses the terms rape and sexual violence consistent with the definitions provided in the 
Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute (specifically Article 7 (1) (g)-1, Article 7 (1) (g)-6, Article 8 (2) 
(b) (xxii)-1 and Article 8 (2)(b) (xxii)-6). See http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-
40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 
13 Tazreena Sajjad, ‘Rape on Trial: Promises of International Jurisprudence, Perils of Retributive 
Justice, and the Realities of Impunity’, in Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, eds. Carol Rittner and 
John K. Roth (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2012), 61-81, at 75. 
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establishing the hard facts, affords little space for victims to express these responses. They 
must tell their stories in a way that enables the court to ascertain a perpetrator’s guilt or 
innocence, rather than in a way that reflects their own needs. As Franke argues, ‘The 
translation of human suffering into the language of law and rights will always satisfy the 
interests of legal authorities more than those who are called to narrate their pain’.14 
          The third point is that more than 20 years on, it seems that X, Y and Z are still very 
much trapped in the role of victims. Feeling helpless, alone and abandoned, they continue to 
view themselves as victims. One of the factors that has arguably contributed to this 
victimological entrenchment, moreover, is the women’s experiences of the criminal justice 
process. Not only did they express a sense of having been forgotten by the legal institutions 
from which they expected justice, but they told their stories in court as victim-witnesses. In 
different ways, X, Y and Z all evinced remarkable courage and strength. They were not 
simply victims of rape but women who had survived rape and who, despite all the challenges 
and obstacles, were trying to live their lives. Within the restrictive confines of the criminal trial 
process, however, victim-witnesses are simply there to recount the crimes committed 
against them, and hence there are few opportunities for them to become cognizant of their 
own resilience and fortitude. Fundamentally, criminal justice procedures ‘tend to entrench 
the war meta-narrative, which in turn provides a gendered script in which women’s many 
different experiences are neglected and muted into a scripted position as “women-as-
victims”’.15  
          The limitations of criminal trials are such that, notwithstanding their importance in post-
conflict societies, we should not over-rely upon them. Dealing with the legacy of the past 
necessarily demands a more diversified and holistic approach.16 The remainder of this 
                                                          
14 Franke, supra n 3 at 821. 
15 Annika Björkdahl and Johanna Mannergren Selimović, ‘Gendering Agency in Transitional Justice’, 
Security Dialogue 46 (2015): 165-182, at 172. 
16 Alexander L. Boraine, ‘Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation’, Journal of International Affairs 
60 (2006); Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence’, 
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section focuses on the concept of justice as recognition, maintaining that this is a vital 
complement to legal justice – and hence a valuable starting point for theorizing and 
developing a more comprehensive approach to justice. 
 
 
2.2 Conceptualizing justice as recognition 
 
Atrocities and war crimes generate powerful calls for justice. According to Shklar, however, 
‘One misses a great deal by looking only at justice’.17 That is, one may lose sight of the very 
entity that gave rise to calls for justice – namely injustice. More specifically, a macro 
approach to justice, through a focus on holding war criminals accountable, can easily eclipse 
the micro dimensions of injustice. Within a normative framework of ‘no impunity’, we demand 
that perpetrators face justice; but what about the survivors and the families of the dead? 
How much do we think about the injustice done to them and what it actually means in the 
context of their everyday post-war lives? Hence, it is the notion of injustice that lies at the 
heart of Haldemman’s theorization of justice as recognition. More specifically, the latter has 
its conceptual origins in the idea of negative morality (as developed in the work of Honneth 
and Margalit18), according to which ‘the primary goal of politics is to give a voice to the 
victimized and marginalized, to see and respond to their experiences of suffering and 
cruelty…’.19 Underscoring the crucial relationship between justice as recognition and 
negative morality, the core of Haldemann’s argument is that: 
 
If we think of the most extreme and radical forms of evil – genocides, massacres, 
mass rape and death camps – as efforts to undermine the very idea of shared 
humanity (the foundation of morality itself), then it seems adequate to put negative 
phenomena [such as injustice, cruelty and humiliation] at the start of our moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 28-48; Rami Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking 
Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
17 Judith Shklar, ‘Giving Justice its Due’, Yale Law Journal 98 (1989): 1135-1151, at 1135. 
18 See, for example, Axel Honneth and Avishai Margalit, ‘Recognition’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 75 (2001): 111-139. 
19 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 682. 
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reflection. Without this change in perspective, we might miss the “negative essence” of 
those nightmarish episodes from which transitional socieities try to recover.20   
 
 
What does it mean in more substantive terms, however, to theorize justice as recognition 
and to foreground negative phenomena? The defining feature of justice as recognition, as 
Haldemann conceptualizes the term, is the fact that in contrast to criminal justice, it is 
quintessentially victim-centred. In short, 'It involves extending to victims the concern and 
respect due to them in virtue of what they have suffered and of what they are...'.21 This focus 
on victims, however, entails far more than a recognition of what was done to them. The 
consequences of a criminal act are both tangible and intangible, and Haldemann is 
specifically concerned with the latter. He contends that the commission of a crime involves a 
symbolic devaluation: the victim is not only harmed but is also shown a fundamental lack of 
respect and concern. To reverse this 'misrecognition', defined as 'a specific attitude of 
treating others as inferior, minor, negligible or simply invisible',22 it is essential to recognize 
the victims' perspective and 'the reality of their individual experiences of suffering and 
harm...'.23 This focus on victims and their lived-experiences of injustice and 'misrecogition' 
means that Haldemann's conceptualization of justice as recognition is sensitive both to the 
ripple effects and to the affective dimensions of crimes in a way that criminal justice is not.24 
It is also a more empowering approach to justice. While it recognizes the suffering of victims, 
the fact that it privileges their perspective is a crucial acknowledgement of their agency.  
          A further dimension of this is that rather than assuming to know what victims need, it is 
an approach that allows them – in the context of discussing their objective and subjective 
                                                          
20 Ibid, 690. 
21 Ibid, 679. 
22 Ibid, 693. 
23 Ibid, 680. See also Jonathan Allen, ‘The Place of Negative Morality in Political Theory’, Political 
Theory 29 (2001): 337-363, at 348. 
24 Haldemann maintains that 'Only by directing our attention to negative symbolism can we gain a 
more detailed view of misrecognition and its impact on victims’ lives'. Ibid, 681. 
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experiences of crime – to express what it is that they need.25 This is an important difference 
between justice as recognition and truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) at the micro 
level. Although TRCs are ostensibly victim-centred, they primarily provide a space for story-
telling rather than for the articulation of individual needs.26 As Robins asserts vis-a-vis the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in East Timor, ‘The cathartic 
metaphor of a truth commission lacks meaning for a family confronted daily with the unmet 
basic needs that arise from the loss of a breadwinning husband or a son’.27 This is not, 
however, to diminish the importance of TRCs. Maintaining that recognition operates at two 
levels, individual and collective, Haldemann convincingly argues that TRCs constitute a 
collective form of justice as recognition.28 They are state-led processes, and it is precisely 
through the intervention of a third party (i.e. the state as a representative of society) that 'the 
relatively private, dyadic offender-offended relation is transformed into a public event, now 
subject to the censure of the wider community'.29 
          More problematic is Haldemann's assertion – and hope – that criminal trials can also 
play a part in dispensing justice as recognition. To sustain this, he maintains that the basic 
rationale for seeking punitive justice needs to change. That is to say that '...we should 
pursue punishment not primarily in terms of deterrence or moral improvement, but rather as 
a way of validating and vindicating the victim of wrongdoing'.30 Punishment does indeed 
serve multiple functions, but to suggest that the main purpose of a quintessentially 
perpetrator-focused criminal process should be the recognition of the victim's suffering is 
discordant. By providing a forum in which some victims are able to tell their stories, albeit in 
                                                          
25 Ibid, 678. 
26 Ibid, 710. 
27 Simon Robins, ‘Challenging the Therapeutic Ethic: A Victim-Centred Evaluation of Transitional 
Justice Process in Timor-Leste’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2012): 83-105, at 101. 
 
28 Haldemann, supra 6 at 710. 
29 Ibid, 701-702. 
30 Ibid, 713. 
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a rather 'chopped' way that suits the needs of the court,31 and by establishing an official 
record of the facts, criminal courts do constitute a form of acknowledgement. The extent to 
which they can deliver justice as recognition in the sense elaborated by Haldemann, 
however, is necessarily limited. Indeed, he himself notes that '...formal justice of this sort, 
cool and cognitive, may fail to properly recognize the injured and their experience of 
uncomprehending suffering'.32  
          Emphasizing that justice as recognition is an vital complement to retributive justice 
and criminal courts, this article analyzes the recent Women's Court in Sarajevo within this 
conceptual framework. Before proceeding to the next section, however, it is necessary to 
flag up two important points. The first is that at the collective level, Haldemann theorizes 
recognition as 'a process of triadic interaction in which the state or “collective other” emerges 
as a kind of moral stand-in, or authority figure, whose role consists of initiating and 
monitoring the appropriate behavioral procedures that are conducive to recognizing the 
victim’s moral injuries'.33  At the Women's Court, although the process was collective, the 
process of interaction was primarily dyadic. Yet it was not a dyadic interaction, as at the 
individual level of recognition, between individual perpetrators and victims because the 
process did not include the former. Rather, the main interaction was between the women 
who 'testified' and the public audience who came to hear their stories.34 The audience, in 
other words, together with the organizers of the Women's Court, was the aforementioned 
'collective other'; and it was the audience and its interactive role in the process, not the 
State, that demonstrated 'the community's solidarity' with the victims.35 The fact, however, 
                                                          
31 Julie Mertus, ‘Shouting from the Bottom of the Well: The Impact of International Trials for Wartime 
Rape on Women’s Agency’, International Feminist Journal of Politics 6 (2004): 110-128, at 112. 
32 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 734.  
33 Ibid, 702. 
34 This audience consisted mainly of women, although a small number men were also present. During 
all four days of the Women's Court, the rows of seats inside the Bosnian Cultural Centre in Sarajevo 
were full. 
 
35 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 702. 
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that the Women's Court will be making a series of official recommendations means that, 
ultimately, it can also be viewed as a triadic interaction between victims, the audience and 
the various governments across the former Yugoslavia. 
          The second point is that the organizers of the Women's Court, led by the Women in 
Black in Belgrade, conceptualized the Court as a feminist approach to justice. Some readers 
may accordingly question why this article uses justice as recognition, rather than femininst 
theory, as its meta framework. To pre-empt such queries, this article theorizes the Court's 
feminist approach to justice as an important dimension of justice as recognition. That the two 
are closely inter-twined is highlighed by the elemental fact that both feminist justice and 
justice as recognition proceed from the same conceptual starting point. Rather than using an 
abstract concept of justice, Women's Courts – like Haldemann's justice as recognition – are 
'grounded in addressing (concrete) injustice'.36 For Haldemann, what is crucial is that we 
give a voice to victims in order to understand how they personally experience injustice and 
negative morality. Part of this process necessarily includes 'the frequency and depths of the 
harms women experience'.37 Yet despite the fact that there are important similarities 
between Haldemann's justice as recognition and feminist theories of transitional justice, this 
article specifically focuses on the former, maintaining that justice as recognition is a 
corrective to some of the more problematic elements of ferminist theories.  
          Firstly, focusing on an act of injustice and on how it makes the victim feel is arguably a 
more constructive approach than focusing on harms done to women as women. The 
emphasis on a meta ‘woman’s experience’, in short, potentially detracts from and dilutes the 
micro specifics of women’s individual experiences. In the particular case of the Women’s 
Court, moreover, to over-emphasize the common factor of gender is deeply discordant with 
the heterogeneity (in terms of ethnic belonging, religious convictions, socio-economic 
                                                          
36 Daša Duhaček, 'Women's Court: A Feminist Approach to In/Justice', in Women’s Court: About the 
Process, ed. Staša Zajović (Belgrade: Women in Black, 2015), 69-99, at 79. 
37 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Advancing Feminist Positioning in the Field of Transitional Justice’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2012): 205-228, at 227. 
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backgrounds, age, etc.) of the women who testified. Precisely because Haldemann’s 
concept of justice as recognition explicitly acknowledges diversity and individuality,38 it offers 
a useful framework within which to analyze and appraise the Women’s Court, spotlighting 
the women’s personal stories rather than simply their common identity as women.   
          Secondly, when we emphasize that women are victims of patriarchy, inequality and 
structural violence, not only does this further contribute to de-individualizing them and de-
personalizing their specific stories, but it also risks essentializing women as victims.39 To cite 
Ní Aoláin, ‘…calling women into view in ways that affirm stereotypes can undercut 
arguments that mandate treating women as fully engaged actors with independent, cross-
cutting and competing needs’.40 The key point about the Women’s Court in Sarajevo is that it 
sought to portray women not simply as victims. They were actors in their own right who were 
given the space and the support to articulate and to interpret what had happened to them. 
According to Marijana Senjak, a psychologist-psychotherapist who worked with the 
witnesses,41 the women retold their stories several times during the regional meetings that 
preceded the Women’s Court; and in the process – and through their interactions with other 
witnesses – they changed their perspective on the meaning of their stories and found new 
meaning in them.42 For her part, Staša Zajović explained that part of the process of 
preparing women to testify at the Court involved introducing them to the writings of 
intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt and Primo Levi. ‘Giving the women a political education 
was important’, she underlined, ‘for allowing them to reflect on their own experiences and to 
                                                          
38 Haldemann emphasizes that ‘To recognize the victims is to manifest an affirmative attitude to them, 
directly and specifically, in response to their special situation’. Haldemann, supra n 6 at 698.  
39 Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘Sexing the Subject of Transitional Justice’, Australian Feminist Law Journal 
32 (2010): 123-147, at 143.  
40 Ní Aoláin, supra n 37 at 220. 
41 Although the Women’s Court was not a court in the legal sense of the term, the women who told 
their stories were consistently referred to as ‘witnesses’. This article accordingly uses the same 
terminology. 
42 Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia, 19 June 2015. 
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appreciate that these experiences constitute valuable knowledge’.43 While justice as 
recognition is partly about recognizing victimhood, the fact that it is far more than this – 
treating victimhood as something temporary44 rather than long-term – means that it provides 
a fitting framework for analyzing the Women’s Court that is consistent with the ethos of the 
Court.   
          Finally, Ní Aoláin, one of the leading scholars on feminist theories of transitional 
justice, herself underscores the importance of Haldemann’s justice as recognition.45 Indeed, 
she goes beyond this, writing:   
 
…I challenge feminist scholars to think of the concept of justice as recognition, explore 
its capacity to address some of the shortcomings that have been identified in the 
institutions and practices of transitional justice and use it as one possible building 
block to get us to a more cohesive and positive feminist version of what justice in 
transition looks like. In doing so, my goal is to drill down to whether harms (the “things” 
to be remedied) in transition are in their conceptualization and practice a route to 
addressing the needs and desires of women.46 
 
Justice as recognition, it is submitted, can facilitate a greater connection between harms and 
needs precisely because, to reiterate, it does not treat those who have suffered injustice 
simply as victims. If, thus, feminist theories of transitional justice can usefully draw on 
Haldemann’s concept of justice as recognition, it is entirely appropriate to assess the 
Women’s Court – a feminist project – within this theoretical framework. 
 
3. Assessing the Women's Court 
 
3.1 The establishment of the court 
 
                                                          
43 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 10 June 2015. 
44 According to De Grieff, ‘The type of recognition that is relevant is one that acknowledges the 
victims’ status as victims and the abuses to which they were subject, gives public space to their 
stories, and tries to reverse the marginalisation which they typically suffer. But this is not all. In fact, it 
is even more important to recognize their status as rights bearers, ultimately, as co-participants in a 
common political project, that is, as citizens’. Pablo de Grieff, ‘Transitional Justice and Development’, 
2009, http://www.developmentideas.info/website/wp-
content/uploads/Ch24_TransitionalJustice_PablodeGreiff_2013.pdf (accessed 3 July 2015), 22-23. 
 
45 Ní Aoláin, supra n 37 at 226-227. 
46 Ibid, 228. 
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The concept of women's courts is not new, and countries as diverse as Nepal, South Africa 
and Auckland have established them.47 The first International Tribunal on Crimes against 
Women was held in Belgium in March 1976. Organized by feminist activists, it covered a 
wide range of themes, from torture and rape to pornography, forced sterilization and 
economic crimes, and over 2,000 women from 40 different countries took part in the event.48 
More recently, in 2000, a Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal was held in Tokyo, to 
consider issues of responsibility relating to Japanese war crimes committed in the Asia 
Pacific during the 1930s and 1940s. Despite their name, Women’s Courts – which are 
temporary bodies – do not have any legal powers. What they do exercise, however, is moral 
authority.49 They give a voice to women who have suffered from multiple types of violence, 
and through public hearings they generate a collective moral condemnation of gender-based 
crimes. These Courts thus become important ‘sites of solidarity’.50 
          It was Zarana Papić, a philosopher and feminist activist from Sarajevo, together with 
the Indian human rights activist Corinne Kumar, who first launched the idea of a Women’s 
Court for the former Yugoslavia in 2000. Although Papić died in 2002, the feminist and anti-
militarist Women in Black in Belgrade – with the ever-energetic Staša Zajović at the helm – 
revived the concept in 2006. Four years later, in December 2010, the Initiative Board of the 
Women’s Court, composed of numerous women’s groups from across the former 
Yugoslavia, formally adopted the initiative to create ‘The Women’s Court for the Region of 
former Yugoslavia’. In 2012, the name was officially changed (due to objections from 
Kosovar Albanian women involved in the process) to ‘The Women’s Court – A Feminist 
                                                          
47 Ljupka Kovačević, Marija Perković and Staša Zajović, Ženski Sud: Feministički Pristup Pravdi 
(Belgrade: Women in Black, 2011), 13. 
48 See Diane E.H. Russell, ‘Report on the International Tribunal on Crimes against Women’, Frontiers: 
A Journal of Women Studies 2 (1977): 1-6. 
49 Christine M. Chinkin, ‘Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery’, The 
American Journal of International Law 95 (2001): 335-341, at 339. 
50 Jill Steans, ’Negotiating the Politics of Difference in the Project of Feminist Solidarity’, Review of 
International Studies 33 (2007): 729-743, at 730. 
16 
 
Approach to Justice’.51 Some 200 NGOs were involved in organizing the Women’s Court 
over a period of five years. During this process, ten consultations and trainings took place, 
as well as 16 regional seminars, 136 public presentations in some 100 towns throughout the 
former Yugoslavia and 16 feminist discussion circles.52 The first meeting with potential 
witnesses was in Tivat in Montenegro in September 2013. The final event, the actual 
Women’s Court, was held at the Bosnian Cultural Centre in Sarajevo between 7 and 10 May 
2015. 
          One of the aims of the Court was to underscore the cross-contextual continuity of 
violence against women during times of both war and peace.53 Accordingly, the proceedings 
were structured around five core themes: (i) war against the civilian population 
(militaristic/ethnic/gender-based violence), (ii) woman’s body – a battlefield (sexual violence 
in war zones), (iii) militaristic violence and women’s resistance, (iv) persecution of those who 
are different – in war and peace (ethnic violence) and (v) an undeclared war (social and 
economic violence, women’s resistance). The witnesses themselves played a significant role 
in selecting the themes to be covered. According to Miloš Urošević from the Women in 
Black, for example, ‘The Women in Black worked with women in Srebrenica and Zvornik [in 
BiH], and they chose to speak about the war against civilians. And women in Serbia chose to 
speak about the issue of forced mobilization’.54 
          If, as Franke points out, ‘it is rare for criminal tribunals to treat gender-based violence 
as anything other than sexual violence’;55 it is noteworthy that many NGOs in BiH wanted 
the main focus of the Women’s Court to be on rape and sexual violence (another reason 
why some of them ultimately boycotted the Court). The Women in Black, however, were 
implacably opposed to this. According to Staša Zajović, ‘To concentrate only on sexual 
                                                          
51 Zajović, supra n 5 at 8-10. 
52 Ibid, 18-19. 
53 Ibid, 26. 
54 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 10 June 2015. 
55 Franke, supra n 3 at 822. 
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violence is a very patriarchal approach that treats women as sexual objects’. She further 
explained that ‘There has been a dangerous tendency to “sexualize” the war in BiH, but you 
cannot reduce the problems of women to sexual violence. You not only ignore the broader 
context of structural violence against women, but you also ignore the very practical needs of 
women’.56 Moreover, to over-emphasize the theme of sexual violence risks de-individualizing 
women, reducing them to a mere number, and indeed this is a common feminist criticism of 
international criminal courts.57 
          Ultimately, the Women’s Court embodied a rich thematic diversity, and this made it a 
significant ‘enabling space’58 for women with different experiences of violence and injustice 
to tell their stories. Furthermore, it allowed them to tell these stories in their own words, as 
individuals, without any questions or interruptions, and to focus on what was personally most 
important to them. To protect the women, journalists were not permitted to attend the 
Women’s Court (but they were invited to morning press conferences). Although members of 
the Women in Black filmed the entire event, the careful positioning of five cameras was 
intended to ensure that the filming was done in a highly sensitive and unobtrusive way.        
          Overwhelmed with emotion, two of the witnesses were unable to finish their stories. 
Some of them spoke at considerable length, unable to say everything that they wanted to in 
the suggested 15 minutes. Some of the stories were extremely difficult to listen to; some 
highlighted issues that have until now received little attention (like the forced mobilization of 
men in Serbia during the 1990s). That some of the women were speaking on the anniversary 
of the crimes committed against them and their families made their stories even more 
                                                          
56 Author interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 11 June 2015. Nesiah, discussing the 2005 International Centre 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Bellagio Workshop on gender and transitional justice, notes that ‘One 
participant recalled that, in the wake of performances of the Vagina Monologues in Afghanistan, one 
Afghan woman told her that her vagina is concerned with socioeconomic issues regarding food 
security’. Vasuki Nesiah, ‘Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An Introductory Essay 
Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and Transitional Justice’, Columbia Journal of 
Gender and Law 15 (2006): 799-812, at 805. 
 
57 See, for example, Franke, supra n 3 at 820-821. 
 
58 Björkdahl and Selimjović, supra n 15 at 173. 
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powerful.59 The audience responded with tears, applause, cheers, ‘expressive bodily 
gestures’60 that conveyed recognition, support and empathy. At the end of each thematic 
session, two or three women – academics and/or human rights activists – delivered their 
insights and thoughts, consistent with the Court’s methodology of linking ‘a subjective text (a 
woman’s testimony) with the objective analysis of political, social-economic and cultural 
context of the violence that took place’.61 More than anything, these reflections provided a 
‘breathing space’, a brief respite from the intensity and emotion of the witnesses’ stories. 
 
3.2 The women’s court and the conferral of justice as recognition 
 
According to Haldemman’s theorization, the essence of justice as recognition is the reversal 
of the victim’s symbolic devaluation.62 Analyzing the Women’s Court within this conceptual 
framework, this article seeks to build on Haldemann’s analysis by examining in more detail 
what this ‘symbolic devaluation’ might entail in practice. It argues that the Women’s Court 
contributed to the process of reversing this devaluation in three key ways. Firstly, by 
enabling the 35 women to speak not only about what they had experienced but also about 
the emotional and cognitive effects, the Court recognized the oft-neglected affective 
dimensions of crime and violence – and more specifically the women’s ‘felt-experience of 
injustice'.63 A woman from Zvornik in BiH, for example, described how, in June 1992, Serb 
forces captured 700 Bosniak men in Zvornik, including her husband. Afraid that her 14-year-
old son would also be taken away, she begged one of the Serb soldiers to spare him. To 
prove her son’s age, she showed the soldier his medical card. That day was the last time 
                                                          
59 A woman from Foča explained that it was exactly 23 years ago that she last saw her husband and 
that his body has never been found. Similarly, a witness from Srebrenica began her story by noting 
that it was 23 years ago to the day that paramilitaries, led by the notorious warlord Željko Raznatović 
(a.k.a. Arkan), forced their way into her home and murdered her husband. 
 
60 Honneth and Margalit, supra n 18 at 119. 
61 See http://www.zenskisud.org/en/Metodologija.html (accessed 9 May 2015). 
62 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 679. 
63 Ibid, 734. 
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that she ever saw her husband. Ten years later, the remains of his body were found and she 
buried him. Her brother was also killed during the Bosnian war. For her, everything 
disappeared in a day. She now lives alone with her son and daughter, and feels immense 
guilt that she did not endeavour to save her husband. Her son was more valuable to her, she 
admitted, and she prays to her husband every night to ask for his understanding and 
forgiveness. For her part, a woman from Srebrenica, who was imprisoned in a camp in the 
municipality of Bratunac, described how it made her feel to be subjected to multiple rapes 
when she was 15 years old. They hurt her body and left a deep scar on her soul, she 
explained. The first time it happened, ‘That’s when I experienced an unknown pain, suffering 
and humiliation’.64 That the Women’s Court gave women a voice with which to speak about 
the different layers of the violence committed against them is a fundamental part of justice as 
recognition – the recognition of a person's individual experiences of harm and suffering.65 
          Secondly, and related to the previous point, if, as Ní Aoláin posits, ‘[a] persistent blind 
spot for transitional justice has been the entrenched habit of zoning in on specific violations 
to the individual…’,66 the Women’s Court recognized the wider impact of these violations and 
their ripple effects. A Kosovar Albanian woman disclosed that as a result of being raped 
during the Kosovo war in 1999, she has contemplated committing suicide, she cannot sleep 
without having the light on and she worries whenever she hears a noise at night. ‘This is the 
trauma that continues’, she said, ‘and I have transferred it to my children’.67 A woman from 
Bijelovac, in the municipality of Bratunac, described her two-year struggle to regain 
possession of the house from which she and her family were expelled in 1992. She 
                                                          
64 The testimonies of the four women who spoke at the Women’s Court specifically about their 
experiences of war rape support Mertus’ argument that ‘In a non-legal setting, a rape survivor would 
tell a much different story, focusing not on the perpetrator, but on her feelings and fears…’. Mertus, 
supra n 31 at 115. 
65 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 680. 
66 Ní Aoláin, supra n 37 at 227. 
67 According to Suarez, inter-generational transmission of trauma is ‘an important yet under examined 
public health problem’ that merits serious attention. Eliana Barrios Suarez, ‘Two Decades Later: The 
Resilience and Post-Traumatic Responses of Indigenous Quechua Girls and Adolescents in the 
Aftermath of the Peruvian Armed Conflict’, Child Abuse and Neglect 37 (2013): 200-210, at 208. 
20 
 
eventually succeeded, but the people living in her house – a family from Vareš in central BiH 
– destroyed it before they left. Today, she and her children live in a collective centre in Tuzla. 
Her husband was killed in Srebrenica and his remains have never been found. A woman 
from Kraljevo in Serbia recounted how one night in 1991, as she and her husband 
celebrated their second wedding anniversary, two soldiers came to the family home and 
declared that they were taking her husband away for military training. Two weeks later, she 
learnt that he had been sent to fight in Vukovar in Croatia.  He was subsequently among a 
group of men who requested to be allowed to go home. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 
promised them that it would find replacement soldiers, but it failed to do this and the men 
were recalled to Vukovar. The men went on strike and her husband returned home. Yet he 
returned as a changed person. She had to get to know him all over again and he never 
talked about his experiences in Vukovar. His trauma put pressure on their marriage and they 
separated five years ago. The women’s stories thus highlighted the fact that injustice is often 
cumulative, rather than a one-off confined event, and thus spans the contexts of war and 
peace. Acknowledging this, as the Women’s Court did, is an key part of justice as 
recognition. 
          Thirdly, if we are to reverse the symbolic devaluation and ‘profound lack of concern’68 
that are intrinsic to the commission of violence, it is necessary to recognize both victimhood 
and agency. ‘Victims’ are a heterogeneous group of individuals with diverse experiences, 
and it is a deeply reductionist approach to focus only on what was done to them. They are 
actors in their own right with aims and objectives, and the Women’s Court recognized this. It 
provided the witnesses with a safe and secure space in which to demonstrate that they are 
not only victims but also survivors – ‘architects of change’69 – who have not given up the 
fight for truth and justice. A Serb woman from Novska in Croatia, for example, talked about 
                                                          
68 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 679. 
69 Roselyn Costantino, ‘Guatemaltecas Have Not Forgotten: From Victims of Sexual Violence to 
Architects of Empowerment in Guatemala’, in Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, eds. Carol Rittner 
and John K. Roth (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2012), 117-137, at p.128. 
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her battle to find out the facts surrounding her husband’s murder in 1991; a Roma woman 
from Niš in Serbia spoke not only as a victim of discrimination but also as a human rights 
activist; and a mother from Leskovac in Serbia whose two sons were forcibly mobilized to 
fight in Kosovo in 1999 described her struggle to have her youngest son released from the 
army, her participation in spontaneous popular protests in Leskovac and her post-war 
activism on the issue of forced mobilization.  
          As previously noted, four women spoke at the Women’s Court specifically about their 
experiences of sexual violence (a fifth woman, from Croatia, revealed that she was raped in 
1991, although this was not the main focus of her story). Franke notes that ‘…narrating 
sexual violation according to the strict rules of legal testimony renders it all the more difficult 
for these victims to script new social possibilities and to claim a self who has a future, and is 
not tethered to a painful past’.70 The Women’s Court, in contrast, enabled those who had 
been raped to demonstrate that notwithstanding their painful pasts, they also had a future – 
and future goals. A woman from the municipality of Foča, for example, disclosed that her life 
wish is to return to her pre-war village, to re-build her home (which was destroyed during the 
war) and to call it the ‘House of Pride’, thereby reflecting her sense of inner strength as a 
woman who has survived the physical and psychological trauma of rape. A witness from 
Srebrenica similarly expressed a sense of pride, describing herself as a strong woman and a 
heroine who, despite everything that she has been through – from rape to domestic violence, 
verbal abuse from her neighbours and extreme economic hardship – is still alive and 
fighting. From now on, she has decided that she will only do things in life that make her 
happy. To great applause from the audience, she emphasized: ‘A part of my childhood was 
taken away from me, but I will not give up on the present and future’. Ultimately, thus, what 
the Court recognized was the women’s courage and tenacity – and hence their contributions 
to transitional justice as a process which is both top-down and bottom-up.71 
                                                          
70 Franke, supra n 3 at 823. 
71 Björkdahl and Selimović, supra n 15 at 171. 
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          If, as this article has sought to demonstrate, the Women’s Court clearly delivered 
justice as recognition by reversing the witnesses’ symbolic devaluation, questions 
nevertheless arise concerning the ethnic balance of this recognition. As previously 
explained, the proceedings of the Court were divided into five thematic sessions. In the first 
session (war against the civilian population), 11 women testified – a Croat from Vukovar, 
three Bosniaks from Srebrenica, two Bosniaks from the municipality of Bratunac, two 
Bosniaks from Zvornik municipality and three Kosovar Albanians. In the second session, on 
sexual violence in war zones, two Bosniaks (from Srebrenica and Foča municipality 
respectively) and two Kosovar Albanian women told their stories. Seven women spoke 
during the third session, which focused on militaristic violence and women’s resistance. Six 
of them were ethnic Serbs (five from Serbia and one from Croatia) and one was 
Macedonian. In the fourth session, centred on ethnic violence and the persecution of those 
who are different in war and peace, eight women testified. Of these, one woman was a 
Roma from Serbia, one was a Serb from Slovenia, two were Muslims from Montenegro, 
three were Serbs from Croatia and one was a Croat. Five women – a Macedonian, three 
Montenegrins and a Serb – spoke in the final session on social and economic violence. 
Unquestionably, the Women’s Court powerfully highlighted the continuity of violence against 
women in both war and peace, thereby drawing attention to ‘the social, political, economic 
forces which have offered structural support to, and thus led to, injustice’.72  
          One potential criticism of the Court, however, is that due to the ethnic composition of 
the thematic panels, it gave the impression that certain ethnic groups suffered from wartime 
violence far more than others.73 Let us consider the panel on wartime sexual violence. 
Academic literature on the use of rape during the Bosnian war, for example, has focused 
                                                          
72 Duhaček, supra n 36 at 72. 
73 Indeed, the 2011 report of the Women’s Court notes that ‘some of women (who were from Serbia 
and did not have the experience of war and extreme violence), told us that they hesitated to testify, 
because their experiences appeared to be “insignificant” compared with suffering of women from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia during the war'. See  
http://www.zenskisud.org/en/pdf/Report%20on%20implemented%20activities%20January%20-
%20December%202011.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015). 
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overwhelmingly on the violation of Bosniak women by Bosnian Serb forces.74 Yet the reality 
is far more complex; all sides committed rape and the victims were not only Bosniaks. As 
part of her Leverhulme-funded research in BiH, for example, the author interviewed 15 
Bosnian Serbs (including one man) who suffered rape and sexual violence in various 
locations, including the Dretelj camp in Čapljina, the Viktor Buban camp in Sarajevo and the 
Lora camp in Split. The Women’s Court represented an opportunity, it is argued, for a more 
nuanced picture to emerge regarding the use of rape during the Bosnian war, but regretfully 
this opportunity was missed. According to Staša Zajović, one problem was that NGOs in BiH 
were not as professional and as organized as they should have been in finding potential 
witnesses.75 Many of the individuals interviewed by this author, for example, were not even 
aware of the Women’s Court; and an interviewee from Macedonia who attended the 
Women’s Court expressed her deep regret that she only found out about it only at the last 
minute and was not able to tell her own story of being raped during the Bosnian war.76  
          When asked about the ethnic composition of the panels, however, all interviewees 
involved in the organization of the Women’s Court – including Zajović herself – underlined 
that the process was never about equalizing ethnic victimhood. Professor Daša Duhaček, for 
example, underscored that ‘You cannot have representation of every crime committed. This 
is impossible’;77 and Vesna Teršelić, a member of the Court’s International Board and the 
head of the NGO Documenta, reflected that ‘Yes, the Women’s Court could have been more 
ethnically balanced, but how would you achieve this? You work with those women who are 
prepared to tell their stories. If the organizers had waited until they had a balanced witness 
                                                          
74 See, for example, Catharine MacKinnon, ‘War, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights’, Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 17 (1994): 5-16; Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape: The War against 
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Beverley Allen, 
Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Thomas A. Salzman, ‘Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: 
Religious, Cultural and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the former Yugoslavia’, Human Rights 
Quarterly 20 (1998): 348-378. 
75 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 10 June 2015. 
76 Personal interview, east Sarajevo, BiH, 26 June 2015. 
77 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 11 June 2015. 
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set, the Women’s Court might never have happened’.78 While these are valid points, it 
should be stressed that the Women’s Court had the potential to challenge the deeply-
entrenched ethnic narratives that continue to frame popular discourse on the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia.79  
          This, however, in turn raises the question of whether the Women’s Court was the right 
forum to tackle these meta-narratives. Had it done so, ethnicity might have become the 
central issue, thereby detracting from the individuality of the women who testified. Moreover, 
had it addressed the issue of ethnicity and victimhood head on, it would have become an 
overtly political space and may thus have been far less successful in contributing to ‘the 
elimination of hierarchies’80 among the women who took part in the process – both those 
who told their stories and those who listened to them. By not directly approaching questions 
of ethnicity, it created an opportunity for women to confront their ethnic prejudices in their 
own individual ways, without being under any pressure to do so. According to Marijana 
Senjak, for example, the regional workshops that preceded the Women’s Court provided a 
space for ‘corrective experiences’. She explained that at one of these workshops, and after 
listening to the stories of Serb women who fought against the forced mobilization of their 
sons, a Bosnian Muslim woman from Srebrenica responded: ‘I’m very glad that I didn’t die 
and that I’ve been able to hear from women from Serbia who did not allow their children to 
kill our children’.81   
          Yet, we also need to look at the wider picture, and a fundamental question is whether 
in the more long term the Women’s Court might have contributed more to the entrenchment 
than to the elimination of ethnic hierarchies of suffering. While the meta-narrative of the 
Court was the persistence of violence against women in war and peace, it remains to be 
                                                          
78 Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia, 19 June 2015. 
79 See, for example, Janine Natalya Clark, International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the 
Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Oxon: Routledge, 2014) 
80 Zajović, supra n 5 at 55. 
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seen whether and to what extent this narrative will resonate – and be understood – outside a 
feminist framework. 
4. Building on the Women’s Court and Future Directions 
 
One of the women (a Serb from Croatia) interviewed for this research was a victim of 
domestic violence and marital rape during the 1990s. She was a potential witness at the 
Women’s Court and although ultimately she did not testify (as there was a sufficient number 
of witnesses from Croatia82), she attended all of the regional workshops and stressed that 
she greatly benefitted from the process. She explained that despite the pain and trauma that 
she suffered during her marriage, she still had to function as a mother to her daughter, to go 
out to work, etc. As a result, ‘I could never be myself. But at Lipik [the location of one of the 
regional workshops], I was finally able to cry and to really be myself’.83 Another interviewee 
in Croatia who did testify at the Women’s Court described what she herself gained from the 
experience. She enjoyed meeting and spending time with the other witnesses, she made 
new friendships and the process helped her both to tell her own story (she fought for 15 
years to reclaim her apartment from a Croatian war veteran) and to hear the stories of other 
women.84 A third interviewee in Croatia, who also testified at the Women’s Court, told the 
author that it was being involved in this transitional justice process that gave her the courage 
and strength to reveal, after more than two decades, that she was raped by a Croatian 
soldier in 1991.85 For her part, a Muslim woman who was raped during the Bosnian war 
emphasized that speaking at the Women’s Court was an extremely rewarding experience 
that empowered her. She further reflected that being a witness and re-telling her story at the 
                                                          
82 Personal interview with Nela Pamuković, Zagreb, Croatia, 19 June 2015. 
83 Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia, 20 June 2015. 
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various regional workshops helped to prepare her for testifying a few weeks later against 
one of her perpetrators at the circuit court in Bijeljina in BiH.86   
          That all of these women had positive experiences at the Women’s Court further 
supports this article’s contention that the latter successfully delivered justice as recognition, 
albeit within somewhat constricted ethnic parameters. Whether and to what extent the Court 
is ultimately judged to have been a success, however, will largely depend on what happens 
next. Staša Zajović underscored that the women who testified will have significant input in 
this regard, adding that the Women in Black are continuing to work closely with them.87 For 
example, some of the witnesses attended a spa weekend in Vrnjačka Banja in Serbia in 
June 2015; and a regional meeting involving all of the witnesses will take place in Tivat in 
Montenegro in late September 2015 to discuss the next steps. What is known at this stage is 
that the women’s testimonies will be published (with their consent) as a book, and a 
documentary film will be made about the Women’s Court.  
          That the Court took place only very recently means that its International Board is yet to 
deliver its final conclusions and recommendations. In pre-empting these, it is this author’s 
contention that the next step should be to consider two fundamental and inter-linked 
questions. Firstly, how can we build on and maintain the solidarity that the Court embodied? 
Secondly, how can we translate the justice as recognition that it delivered into something 
more concrete and long-lasting?  
          Turning to the first question, solidarity is a process rather than a state, ‘a project that is 
forged through political struggle’.88 The core of this struggle, according to Steans, is ‘an 
effort to secure a basis for unity in the midst of differences’.89 If the Court’s proceedings 
secured a basis for unity, what is the basis for that unity now that those proceedings have 
                                                          
86 Personal interview, Tuzla, BiH, 30 May 2015. 
87 Personal interview, Belgrade, Serbia, 11 June 2015. 
88 Steans, supra n 50 at 736. 
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been completed (in the sense that the Court was formally in existence only for four days)? 
What, in other words, is the long-term basis for the solidarity that the Court embodied? The 
‘common threads’ of women’s gendered experiences90 are not enough. On the final day of 
the Women’s Court, the seven-member International Board presented some preliminary 
recommendations. Many of these, however, were extremely broad and overly-ambitious. 
They included, for example, demands for an end to militarism and military spending, a 
reversal of the privatization of public goods and the elimination of patriarchal attitudes that 
feed violence against women. If the Court is to be more than a limited, one-off expression of 
cross-ethnic female solidarity, the formulation of more concrete and achievable objectives is 
essential. Although one of the aims of the Court was to understand the macro context in 
which violence occurs and is made possible,91 its final recommendations must not lose sight 
of the micro context and the multiple needs to which violence gives rise.  
          It is precisely these needs that potentially provide a basis for a more enduring 
solidarity. If, as Rimmer argues, ‘…transitional justice outcomes that benefit women are 
unattainable unless the full realities of their lives before and after the conflict are 
understood’,92 continuing dialogue and exchange are essential, focused not just on the 
harms suffered but on common cross-ethnic needs such as existential security, employment 
and opportunities to socialize. This is consistent with Bell and O’Rourke’s emphasis on ‘the 
need to approach transitional justice projects from the question of how best to pursue the 
inevitably internally contested political project of securing material gains for women through 
periods of transition’.93 The identification of needs, in turn, can potentially help to create 
more practical forms of solidarity. Kent, for example, describes how in East Timor, the 
                                                          
90 Christina M. Morus, ‘War Rape and the Global Condition of Womanhood: Learning from the 
Bosnian War’, in Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, eds. Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (St. Paul, 
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91 Zajović, supra n 5 at 26. 
92 Rimmer, supra n 39 at 137. 
93 Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An 
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members of various widows’ groups ‘also assist one another in practical ways by engaging 
in collective economic activities, such as working in each other’s fields and establishing 
cooperatives to sell products such as cassava and rice’94.  
          Haldemann’s justice as recognition does not address the issue of cross-ethnic or 
female solidarity. One of the issues with his conceptualization, however, is precisely that it is 
somewhat weak in explaining exactly what justice as recognition entails in concrete terms. 
Indeed, he himself acknowledges that ‘A fuller treatment of the subject, which this article 
cannot offer, would give a much richer account of how such recognition can be achieved in 
the aftermath of mass atrocity’.95 Focusing on the creation and maintenance of solidarity, 
through an emphasis on needs, is not only consistent with feminist theories of transitional 
justice, but it also provides the basis for a more practical form of justice as recognition in 
which the initial harm becomes transformative rather than entrenched. 
          Turning more directly to the question of how the symbolic justice as recognition which 
the Women’s Court delivered might be developed into a more tangible and substantive form, 
Haldemann makes it clear that the concept of justice as recognition includes apologies,96 
reparations97 and positive symbolism.98 Some of the more specific preliminary 
recommendations which the Court’s International Board expressed included the payment of 
reparations to survivors of violence and the creation of memorials to commemorate the 
suffering and bravery of women. These recommendations should be included, and 
developed, in its final report. It is further argued that these recommendations should directly 
address the fact that some survivors have little awareness of their rights and/or feel unable – 
due, inter alia, to fear, shame and the persistence of an ethnically-based competitive 
                                                          
94 Lisa Kent, ‘Local Memory Practices in East Timor: Disrupting Transitional Justice Narratives’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011): 434-455, at 446. 
95 Haldemann, supra n 6 at 732. 
96 Ibid, 726-727. 
97 Ibid, 728-730. 
98 Ibid, 730. 
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victimhood99 – to speak out. The solidarity which existed during the four-days of the Court’s 
proceedings was based on the fact, consistent with the Common Ingroup Identity Model,100 
that it fostered a superordinate identity that transcended ethnic differences. Particularly due 
to the risk, as previously noted, that individuals not involved in the Court could potentially 
interpret its proceedings simply as confirming their group’s ethnic narrative that ‘we suffered 
the most’, it is incumbent on the International Board to present in its final report possible 
ways of reducing competitive victimhood – and thus of drawing attention to shared 
experiences and goals rather than ethnic differences.  
          If education is a crucial part of this process, Women’s Courts can fulfil an important 
‘educative role’;101 and the International Board has recognized this. Among its preliminary 
recommendations, for example, it emphasized that the five years of work that went into the 
Court and the rich testimonies delivered during the four days of hearings represent a critical 
history that must be made public – including through teaching in schools – so that it can 
never be forgotten. Furthermore, one of the members of the International Board, Vesna 
Teršelić, stressed the right of future generations to learn about history based on concrete 
facts.102 If one of the tasks of those involved in the Court is to develop its educational legacy, 
it is submitted that the Board’s final report should, more broadly, address the important 
relationship between education and transitional justice and its translation into practice.103  
                                                          
99 Andrighetto et al. note that ‘…people often interpret the impact of the conflict subjectively, viewing 
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          Finally, it is argued that through its final report and recommendations, the Women’s 
Court can potentially make a significant contribution to the development of transitional 
justice. According to Haldemann, ‘…the trauma of humiliation can constitute a serious injury, 
sometimes on par with physical cruelty – and if this is so, then we should make it a central 
concern of our reflections on transitional justice’.104 The testimonies delivered at the 
Women’s Court powerfully conveyed the emotional and psychological consequences of 
violence and injustice, and the recognition and redress of these consequences is crucial for 
advancing a more ‘victim-centred transitional justice’.105 If many questions surrounding the 
relationship between transitional justice and trauma remain to be explored,106 the final report 
of the Women’s Court should consider the significant issue of how a concern with trauma 
and humiliation can be directly built into the design of transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
'Never again' has become a well-worn phrase. They are words that are easy to utter but they 
also invite us to reflect: 'The next time you say or hear someone say “never again”, ask what 
she, he, or you have done to be sure that never again means something'.107 The Women's 
Court was an attempt to do something, to give the words 'never again' meaning. Whether or 
not the Court ultimately has any long-term effects remains to be seen; much will depend on 
the recommendations contained in its final report and on the future activities (media work, 
educational activities and so on) that follow on from these. This article, however, has sought 
to demonstrate that the Court represents a successful example of justice as recognition.           
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          Specifically, it recognized the multiple forms of violence committed against women 
during war and peace, the experiential and affective dimensions of injustice and the crucial 
fact that yesterday's victims can become today's activists. Perhaps what it highlighted most 
of all is that all of us should be part of the fight against injustice. The women's stories 
powerfully conveyed the crucial message that none of us should allow ourselves to become 
what Shklar terms 'passively unjust' individuals108 – people who are indifferent to the 
injustices and violence taking place around them. 
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